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With the collapse of Communist power in the Soviet Union, 
considerable attention has focused on the lessons produced by the 
experiment with Marxist socialism in the Russian empire and what 
we might regard as the legacies of Communism. One of the most 
highly visible legacies of that system is a pattern of environmental 
neglect that stretches from the Baltics to the Kamchatka peninsula. 
As a public issue, ecology only emerged in the final years of 
communist rule in the USSR, initially as part of Gorbachev's 
glasnost and, later, as a component of the country's increasingly 
vocal nationalist movements. A radioactive explosion in Tomsk-7 
in April, 1 993,1 served as a reminder that the system which 
produced Chernobyl had not disappeared but had simply been 
passed on to the successors of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, who now faced an ecological nightmare inherited from the 
old regime. This paper is an examination of the appearance of 
ecological concerns as a public issue, the often inadequate response 
of the system to those concerns, what that response revealed about 
the changing Soviet system, and, finally, the environmental 
situation which faces the post-Communist leadership of what was 
the Soviet Union. 
The Appearance of Environmental Problems 
One of the most frequently asked questions among Western 
specialists on Soviet affairs during the final years of Communist 
power in the USSR was whether or not perestroika was an 
irreversible process. As speculation mounted about the prospects 
for a crackdown on the separatist and dissident movements which 
proliferated after the mid-l 980s, there was an increase in Western 
uncertainty about how easily perestroika's consequences might be 
reversed. Among those who examined specific policy concerns 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, April 7, 1993 
Volume 18, Numbers 2, Summer 1993 
132 Stephen R. Bowers 
which had arisen during the period of perestroika, attention was 
focused on several policies which were clearly a process of peres-
troika. One of the most important of these was Moscow's environ-
mental policy, something which was significant not only for what 
it revealed about systemic change but also because of growing 
global concern about ecological concerns. This global concern 
reached the USSR's increasingly skeptical citizens and contributed 
to the appearance of an active "civil society" which helped under-
mine the dogmatic foundations of the USSR. 
The traditional view of the Soviet policy process was based 
on the perhaps simplistic assumption that the Communist Party, 
under the leadership of the Politburo, shaped and guided every 
aspect of public policy as well as numerous features of private 
endeavor. In decision-making on economic and industrial con-
cerns, this approach was founded on the Stalinist notion of 
development in which there was a comprehensive build-up of 
heavy engineering and weapons enterprises but little or no 
emphasis on the short-term satisfaction of consumer needs. 
Enforcement powers, delegated by the Party, were held by a highly 
centralized bureaucratic apparatus located, for the most part, in 
Moscow and having little extended, direct contact with those 
individuals or regions upon which policy had its greatest impact. 
At this time, the military, which would later be called to account 
for some of its environmental practices, played a significant part in 
decision-making and did much to shape the USSR's policies in the 
development of nuclear energy. In this process there was little 
place for popular, non-Party activism or for specialist opinion 
based even superficially on anything other than Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy as interpreted by the Party leadership. 
As part of an effort to understand what happened to the 
Soviet Union after August 1991, environmental policy is an 
appropriate one to examine for at least two reasons. First, it was 
one of the earliest policies to demonstrate the depth of change in 
Moscow's decision-making process, and therefore enjoyed a longer 
period of time in which to demonstrate clear accomplishments. 
Second, the regime'S modified approach to ecological concerns was 
marked by a direct association with the destabilizing tendencies 
which eventually destroyed the USSR's state structure and, finally, 
the Soviet Union itself. In short, environmental policy er~joyed the 
distinction of being significant as an indicator of change, but it was 
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 
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not directly burdened by the political volatility characteristic of the 
USSR's ethnic and separatist movements. 
Traditional Environmentalism: Marxist Dogmatism 
The traditionalism of Soviet political concerns was matched 
by an equally traditional view of environmental.issues. In the 
official Soviet view, ecological problems were SImply another 
measure of the crisis of capitalism and further evidence that the 
sins of capitalism were being visited on the children of that system. 
Soviet policies, being ideologically grounded, were, by definition, 
environmentally sound. Environmental waste, abuse, and misman-
agement, according to the public statements of the leadership, 
simply could not exist in the USSR. According to Article 18 of the 
Soviet Constitution, the Soviet state was committed to the "scientif-
ic, rational use of the land" and was pledged "to preserve the 
purity of air and water, ensure reproduction of natural wealth, ~nd 
improve the human environment." In Article 67 of the ConstItu-
tion, one of the duties of Soviet citizens was "to protect nature and 
conserve its riches."2 The Soviet Constitution, unfortunately, was 
more of a programmatic document than a guide to actual practice. 
It should not, therefore, be surprising that as these provisions were 
being written into the 1977 constitution, Soviet auth?rities w~re 
beginning a process of tightening up on the release of lllform.at~on 
about environmental conditions. With the USSR's dechmng 
economic fortunes in that decade, there could be little doubt that 
official priorities rested heavily on the side of production, some-
thing which seemed to enjoy an even higher place in the minds of 
Soviet officials than the oft-quoted maxims of Marxism-Leninism. 
When environmental concerns finally became a matter of public 
debate, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, 
reeling under the impact of the Chernobyl disaster and offering a 
candid assessment of the system, complained that, in spite of 
constitutional claims to the contrary, long-term Soviet industrial 
practice was mandated that only left-over materials and financial 
resources were allocated for the protection of nature. 3 
By the mid-1970s, Soviet statements about environmental 
Constitution of the USSR, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1977, pp. 27-28 and 
p.52. 
> Pravda Ukrainy, May 22, 1988, pp. 1-3. 
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matters acknowledged the existence of a global ecological crisis, but 
treated it as primarily a concern and product of capitalism.4 This 
view, of course, supported official policy with its emphasis upon 
doing everything possible to enhance the productive capacity of a 
declining Soviet industrial apparatus. Although the USSR Council 
of Ministers passed a resolu tion on air pollu tion in 1949, au thori-
ties consistently maintained that Soviet practices, being ideological-
ly sound, were equally sound ecologically and there was no real 
environmental problem in the USSR. Yet, according to a Soviet 
study smuggled into the West, by the late 1970s, for each unit of 
goods, the socialist economy produced twice as many pollutants of 
all sorts, and each Soviet au tomobile was poisoning its environment 
almost four times as much as each American car. 5 
The turning point in the Kremlin's treatment of environ-
mental questions was the Chernobyl nuclear accident in April 1986, 
an incident that highlighted the persistent Soviet tendency to 
reveal little or nothing about sensitive environmental concerns, 
even those having an impact far beyond the frontiers of the USSR. 
Coming shortly after Gorbachev's declaration of glasnost, official 
treatment of the accident seemed to confirm Western suspicions 
that Gorbachev's policy of "openness" was meaningless in critical 
situations. In the face of mounting international pressure, the 
regime provided considerable information about the causes as well 
as the consequences and costs of the accident. In the aftermath of 
these disclosures, public discussion of various environmental issues 
became not only acceptable but was encouraged as scientists, 
economists, intellectuals and others joined in an open debate. In 
1988, a Soviet radio commentary expressed the new official 
attitude with an observation that "since ecological problems were 
hushed up for a long time, we now come face to face with those 
problems." Glasnost and perestroika, according to the commentary, 
would help in the search for effective ways to improve the environ-
mental situation. This apparently new spirit prompted the CPSU 
Central Committee to join the USSR Council of Ministers in calling 
for a "single state ecological policy" and increased public awareness 
I. Gerasimov and M. Budyko, "Urgent Problems of Man's Interaction With 
Nature", Kommunist, No. 10, July, 1974, pp. 79-91. 
5 Boris Komarov, The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union, London: Pluto Press, 
Ud, 1978, p. 30 
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of the significance of environmental concerns. 6 
Official acknowledgment of the Chernobyl incident was 
followed by seemingly endless accounts about the consequences of 
what some Soviet scientists have described as the "largest planetary 
catastrophe suffered at the hands of man." A public that had long 
been told there was no environmental neglect in the USSR 
suddenly learned that Soviet industrial practices had produced 
many ecological nightmares. The Ukraine in particular was the site 
of numerous environmental crises other than Chernobyl and, 
according to one study, of the former USSR's fifty most polluted 
cities, eight were in the Ukraine. Even more important, of fifty-five 
Ukrainian farms that were observed over a one-year period, thirty-
three were found to be suffering from pesticide contamination. 7 
Newspaper and other accounts in the popular media informed the 
public about the basic details of Chernobyl while books such as 
Zhores Medvedev's Legacy of Chernobyl endeavored to look beyond 
the short-term impact of the reactor's malfunction. A more recent 
study, published after the collapse of the USSR, attempting to 
assess the full demographic consequences of Chernobyl, concluded 
that while almost one million people are threatened with increased 
radiation risks as a result of participating in the cleanup or living 
near the nuclear power facility, as many as 18 million people who 
live in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia will suffer as a result of the 
accident. According to the study, these states will feel the effects of 
Chernobyl not only in the deterioration of public health but also 
in a negative migration process which will mean a long-term 
population decline in the affected areas. 8 
Institutional Environmentalism: Structural Adaptation 
A fundamentalquestion about Soviet policy during the final 
years of the Gorbachev era, one that was central to determining if 
there was a divergence from traditional policy, had to do with 
when environmental concerns would finally carry sufficient weight 
Radio Moscow World Service, January 18, 1988 and Pravda,january 17, 1988, 
pp.1-2 
7 David Marples, 'The Ecological Situation in the Ukraine", Report on the USSR, 
January 19, 1990, pp. 23-24. 
B Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky, "Demographic Consequences of the Accident 
at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant", Sotsiologicheskiye Issledovaniya, No.9, September, 
1992, pp. 40-50 
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to compel authorities to make decisions that entailed significant 
economic costs. As of the early 1980s, Soviet economists consistent-
ly embraced the view that the nation simply could not afford the 
excessive costs required for environmental protection. 9 However, 
with the impact of Chernobyl, the regime began to move away 
from this position and was willing to consider costly decisions in 
the interest of ecological protection. For the first time, a rigid, 
dogmatic system seemed willing to adapt to a new situation. Soviet 
writings began to stress the cost of environmental neglect and 
emphasized the necessity of exercising greater caution in industrial 
practice. For example, in 1988, when an oil leak was detected in 
the Moscow River, authorities denounced the "negligent attitude" 
that caused the leak and detailed the environmental costs in terms 
of rubles as well as damage to fish management in the river. 10 
Finally, an official tendency emerged in which spokesmen would 
argue that it was ecological neglect, not environmental protection, 
that was too expensive. 
An important new feature of Soviet environmental policy 
during this period was the issue of enforcement of legislation. In 
the past, there had been a comfortable relationship between 
industries and the administrative agencies responsible for maintain-
ing legal ecological standards. Ecological problems were ignored 
because production enjoyed the highest priority and environmental 
standards were loosely enforced. By 1986, au thority for enforce-
ment of existing legislation was finally shifting toward police 
agencies such as the Ministry of Interior (MVD), whose personnel 
did not share administrative responsibility for meeting production 
quotas, but simply for maintaining legally mandated environmental 
requirements. In June 1986, Soviet environmental authorities 
declared that the monitoring of water resource standards had been 
unsatisfactory and called upon local Soviets as well as the Ministry 
ofInternalAffairs (MVD) to playa more assertive monitoring role. II 
In an examination of environmental monitoring practices, the 
Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party supported 
those findings and denounced Ukrainian efforts as "unprincipled 
10 
11 
Komarov, p. 29 
Moscow Radio Domestic Service, January 13, 1988 
Izvestia,jul1R 19, 1986, pp. 1-2 
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and irresponsible." 12 Within a year there were reports of stronger 
measures to protect special water assets such as Lake Baikal and 
Lake Ladoga. There were also reprimands and other punishments 
for officials at the ministerial level who had neglected their 
enforcement obligations. Announcements of these actions implied 
that the officials were not simply part of a larger process of 
replacement of elites but were, in fact, being punished for their 
environmental failures. 13 
The culmination of these studies was the creation of a new 
institution for enforcement of environmental legislation. In 
January 1988, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR 
Council of Ministers announced the formation of a new state 
environmental protection committee with extensive powers that 
would support its fulfillment of a "long-term national program of 
environmental protection and rational use of natural resources." 
The bureaucratic vehicle for this intensified official interest in 
enforcement of environmental standards was the USSR Union 
Republic State Committee for Environmental Control or, as it was 
more widely known, the USSR Goskompriroda. This agency 
became the central organ of state environmental management and 
had responsibility for a wide variety of enforcement actions, 
including the imposition of environmental tests in the development 
of new technologies and the management of wildlife and hunting 
preserves. It was also responsible for public education about 
ecological issues as well as for insuring cooperation with other 
nations in protecting environmental assets. General guidance on 
Soviet environmental protection was provided through a public 
council consisting of scientists, various public figures, representa-
tives oflocal Soviets, and enterprise directors. Eventually, Goskom-
priroda's institutional status was elevated to that of a Ministry and 
the agency was generally referred to as :Minpriroda. 14 
Another new aspect of Soviet policy was the environmental 
legislation itself. '''Tithin a year of the Chernobyl incident, discus-
sions of changes in ecological legislation became a routine feature 
of the Soviet media. In an interview in December 1987, Vladimir 
12 Pravda Ukminy (Kiev), Alay 22, 1988, pp. 1-3 
13 Foreign Broadcast InJormation Service: Daily Reports-Soviet Union, May 19, 1987, 
p. RI-3; May 21, 1988, p. Rl; and May 28, 1987, p. R3. 
14 Pravda,january 17, 1988, j)p. 1-2 
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Gubarev, Deputy Justice Minister at the time, indicated that the 
new USSR Goskompriroda would advance the introduction of a 
new body oflegislation in order to punish ecological offenders and 
to encourage the correct use of resources. Mechanisms to be 
employed under the new legislation included the introduction of 
cost accounting to encourage producers to minimize pollution, a 
system of heavy fines against violators, the upgrading of purifica-
tion systems, and a pricing policy that would reward ecologically 
clean products. The system of fines established an arrangement 
whereby accumulated funds were to be used for unanticipated 
environmental work, somewhat like the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency "super fund". 15 As noted earlier, even before 
implementation of the new legislation, there were clear indications 
of a new official spirit about dealing with those responsible for 
environmental neglect. 16 The Ukraine was a national leader in 
this process and, after taking severe actions against numerous 
department heads and even a deputy chairman of the Ukrainian 
Council of Ministers, in 1991 the government, under pressure 
from environmental advocacy groups, passed legislation that would 
provide for prison sentences for individuals guilty of negligence in 
the mishandling of radioactive materials. 17 The enormous costs 
associated with the mishandling of radioactive waste were dramati-
cally illustrated in 1991 when a town in the Sverdlovsk Oblast had 
to be permanently evacuated following its designation as a 
radiation disaster zone. 18 Negligence was also cited as a key 
factor in the explosion at the nuclear processing plant in Tomsk-7 
in April 1993.19 
As the Ukrainians began their efforts to make the USSR 
responsive to reality by detailing a program to create a market 
economy, environmental concerns were reflected in the imple-
menting legislation. Section 8 of the Ukrainian law was devoted to 
ecological protective measures as well as to steps for the rehabilita-
tion of the republic'S environment. The starting point was a 
declaration of the high "priority of the ecology over other problems 
of socio-economic development," a radical departure from tradi-
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Radio Liberty Research, RL492/87, December 4, 1987, p. 10 
FBIS: Daily Reports - Soviet Union, May 19, 1987, pp. R1-3. 
Ibid., February 6, 1991, p. 1 
A. Tarasov, "Evacuation 40 Years On", Iz.veslia,january 11,1991, p. 5 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 69, April 13, 1993. 
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tional Soviet policies. Another feature of the Ukrainian law was 
that, finally, public opinion was to be taken into account .on 
questions about industrial productiOl~ metho?s, thus transforr:un,g 
a populist environmental approach mto pohcy. As the Ukrame s 
economy evolved in the direction of a market system, the enter-
prise itself was held responsible for environmental protection and, 
where ecologically destructive acts were noted, the corporate 
officials were to pay the costs associated with environmental 
damage. Such payments were transferred into a non-budget state 
. I . 20 fund for enVIronmenta protectIOn. 
The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, not the local party, was at 
the forefront in recognizing the inadequacies of environmental 
protection in the Ukraine. As reports indicated increasingly 
dangerous levels of radioactivity in 1991, there was a c~rrespo~d­
ing effort by the republic's government to deal more dIrectly wIth 
environmental threats. New legislation was supplementedby efforts 
of the Kiev branch of Intourist, which began tourist visits to 
Kopachi, the dead city of Ch~rnobyl, ~s a way ~f commeI~?rating 
the fifth anniversary of the dIsaster. 2 Ukrauuan authonties also 
noted the detrimental role of the Soviet military in shaping Soviet 
nuclear development programs. During his visit to Austria in 1991, 
the Ukrainian Energy Minister, Vitaly Sklyarov, declared that " ... if 
the military had not interfered, nuclear fission and nuclear energy 
as a technical invention would still be just in the laboratory" instead 
of threatening the world's environment. 22 • 
While many praised Gorbachev's glasnost for advancmg 
discussions of the environmental situation, the difficulties faced by 
environmental reformers were aggravated by many of Gorbachev's 
economic reforms. Market conditions, for example, as applied in 
the Soviet setting, often had a negative impact on ecological 
standards. An evaluation of the work of the Goskompriroda after 
almost three years indicated that this institution, presumably 
valued for its independent experts motivated by a concern for 
environmental protection, was not above the same pressures that 
inhibited the work of other agencies. Within a short time, Goskom-
priroda's activities were linked with entrepreneurial interests, 
20 
21 
22 
Pravda Uk.rainy (Kiev), November 16, 1990, pp. 1-2 
Iz.vestia, February 4, 1991, p. 1 
FBIS: Daily Reports - Soviet Union, No. 25, February 6, 1991, p. 96 
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because funds for various nuclear power stations were coming 
from the same source as Goskompriroda funds. In a dispute over 
the proposed construction of a nuclear power plant on the banks 
of the Tsimlyansk Water Reservoir near Rostov, citizens who 
turned to Goskompriroda for assistance found that the concerns of 
~his agency were coordinated with those of the nuclear power 
mterests. Such an arrangement was, in fact, the intention of Soviet 
legislation as outlined in the 1990 USSR Council of Ministers 
resolution "Concerning Urgent Measures to Normalize the 
Consumer Market, the Circulation of Money, and To Strengthen 
State Monitoring of Prices." In point 12, this resolu tion denounced 
the local practice of interfering with the operations of enterprises 
~hat were under Union or central jurisdiction. The "pretext of 
madequate ecological safety" was specifically noted as an inade-
quate reason for limiting operations of Union enterprises such as 
nuclear power installations. The dominant concern, in the view of 
ceI~tral authoritie~, was to improve Soviet economic output. 23 
F~lure to. su~or~ll1ate. this environmental protection agency to a 
dIfferent ll1stItutlOnal ll1terest was an inherent limitation on its 
independence. This structural oversight (if it was, in fact, an 
oversight rather than a deliberate decision) seriously undermined 
institutional environmentalism as a way of dealing with the USSR's 
deteriorating ecology. It seems obvious that what the Soviet 
"center" was attempting to do in this period was to use ecological 
concerns as a rationale for keeping the Soviet Union together in 
the face of growing disunity. Evidently, elements of the Soviet 
lea~ership were willing to allow public oversight but only of the 
envIronmental effects of local firms, not of all-Union enterprises 
such as the nuclear power industry. In short, Moscow's authorities 
wanted to have it both ways: to play an environmental "card" while 
also maintaining an official emphasis on enhancing production at 
the expense of ecological concerns. 
Populist Environmentalism: Democratic Adaptation 
Events of the Gorbachev era signalled important changes 
2' P. Penezhko, "A "Kept" Expert Commission or Who is Paying the USSR 
Goskompriroda and For What?", Trud (Moscow), November 1, 1990, p. 2 and "The Politics 
of Envir~nmell~al Protection in the USSR: The Case of the Soviet EPA", United States 
Injomzatwn Agency Research Memorandu.m, September 22, 1989. 
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in how the leadership would attempt to deal with its increasingly 
important environmental issue. In 1991, a poll conducted by the 
Russian State Statistical Office indicated that 74% of the respon-
dents viewed their ecological situation as "intolerable" and that 20% 
would like to move in order to find better environmental condi-
tions. 24 One of the first consequences of such attitudes was the 
continuation and even intensification of massive protests in the 
form of demonstrations and petitions relating to policies affecting 
environmental conditions. It should be noted that, while 1986 and 
1987 were the first years of massive environmental protests, the 
way had been slowly prepared over decades by the studentdruzhiny 
or conservation brigades and the activities of Vera Briusova and 
Sergei Zalygin in opposition to authorities' efforts to reverse the 
directions of Soviet rivers. These activities, however, were on a 
relatively small scale, while the activism of this period was exempli-
fied by events such as the call by the Latvian Environmental 
Protection Club in 1988 for a massive show of popular opposition 
to the construction of a Riga subway system. On April 27, 1988, 
over 15,000 people joined in a protest against the subway plan, 
which was denounced as both economically unsound and environ-
mentally unsafe. That such things were happening was, by itself, 
significant but, even more important, local officials indicated a 
willingness to act on the basis of popular sentiment. One of the 
first examples of this tendency was the 1988 announcement of a 
change in plans for construction of a pharmaceutical plan in 
Kazakhstan. Environmental concerns were cited as the determining 
factor in this decision. 25 These and other similar actions were a 
clear indication of a restructuring of the Soviet system that had 
touched both the decision-making process as well as decision 
outcomes. 
The wave of environmental protests was significant not only 
because it indicated a broadening of the spectrum of society that 
had an involvement in public issues and a pronounced tendency 
toward non-Party activism, but also because it was a measure of a 
new official attitude. None of this would have been permissible in 
24 Moscow Radio Rossii Network,July 1, 1991, cited injPRS Report: Environmen-
tal ]ssu.es,jPRS-TEN-91-015, August 7, 1991, p. 62 
25 Radio Free Europe Research, Situation Report: Baltic Area, 5/88, May 20, 
1988, p. 19 
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the USSR ofBrezhnev, Andropov, or Chernenko. The fact that the 
Party and the governmental press routinely reported on the efforts 
of Soviet environmentalists and acknowledged the size of protests 
reflected official tolerance of such activities. Pravda, in reporting on 
them, acknowledged both the size and purposes of the numerous 
demonstrations that had spread throughout the nation. The media 
noted the first steps of this populist environmentalism in 1986 
when hundreds of letters were dispatched to the CPSU Central 
Committee and to various newspapers in the Baltic republics. This 
early campaign was motivated by popular concerns about the 
ecological destruction of the Kurskaya Kosa peninsula on the Baltic 
coast. The Baltic area protests continued in spite of publication of 
a study in 1987 which claimed that the region enjoyed high 
environmental standards and had not suffered from the Chernobyl 
power plant accident the previous year. 26 Popular skepticism was 
a core element of this form of environmentalism and helped 
cultivate citizens' willingness to openly challenge other official 
assumptions about non-environmental issues. 
This broadening of that segment of the Soviet population 
that was actively involved in the policy process resulted in the 
formation of a Soviet "Green Front" that rivaled those of Western 
nations in terms of its diversity and intensity. As expressions of 
populist environmentalism, "Green" organizations became a routine 
feature of the Soviet political scene. Five groups emerged as the 
dominant forces among the Soviet "Greens". The largest of these 
was the Social-Ecological Union, an "umbrella" group consisting of 
about 200 branches. The Social-Ecological Union was committed 
to the proposition that environmental problems could be solved 
only through political change. A split within this organization led 
to the creation of the Ecological Union, a group with a more 
limited agenda, the key feature of which was the demand for 
stricter monitoring of pollution. A third group, the Ecological 
Foundation, worked to establish a fund that would be collected 
through the government's levying of fines against polluters. The 
Foundation stressed its interest in using this money to develop 
alternative power sources. Closely associated with the Russian 
26 Pravda, April 18, 1988, p. 19 and AnI! Sheehy and Sergei Voronitsyn, "Ecological 
Protests in the USSR, 1986-88", Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL 191/88, May 11, 1988, 
p.2 
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nationalist movement, a fourth grou p, the Ecological Society of the 
Soviet Union, advocated many of the ideas of Valentin Rasputin, 
who argued that Soviet-style "progress" was degrading what was 
best in Russian life and began to work actively with the nationalist 
group Pamyat. Finally, the All-Union Movement of Greens, 
supported by the CPSU's Komsomol, represented an official effort 
to harness the energies of the USSR's "Green Front". 27 
In the Ukraine, where ecology had become an important 
and emotional issue, the ecological association "Zelenyi svit" ("Green 
World") was one of the most effective organizations in the republic. 
The head of "Zelenyi svit," Yuri Scherbak, claimed that in its first 
two years the organization was instrumental in blocking further 
work on the Danube-Dnieper Canal, on reactors in five and six of 
the Chernobyl power plant, and on a Crimean chemical combine. 
In its work, "Zelenyi svit" challenged the official function of the 
State Committee for the Protection of Nature, arguing that the 
agency failed adequately to protect the endangered Azov Sea. 
Because of public concerns over the State Committee's work, a 
"Public Committee to Preserve the Azov Sea" was founded. The 
success of "Zelenyi svit" came as a result of growing popular 
recognition of the Ukraine's disastrous ecological state and in spite 
of the bitter opposition of the State Committee for the Protection 
of Nature. The persistence of severe pollution-related illnesses and 
the expanding after-effects of Chernobyl gave this organization the 
popular support that transformed it into a respected and authentic 
force in the Ukrainian policy process. 28 
One important aspect of populist environmentalism in the 
final years of the USSR was popular readiness to accept decisions 
which were economically disadvantageous. Several cases demon-
strated this new tendency in decision-making. One of the earliest 
was a demonstration in Kazan by residents calling upon authorities 
to halt construction of industrial enterprises seen as environmental-
ly harmful. Numerous incidents reflected popular willingness to 
make economic sacrifices in order to protect not only the environ-
ment bu t also their health, the threat to which was increasingly 
apparent as a result of environmental neglect. Reports about 
27 ''The Poisoned Giant Wakes Up", The Economist, November 4, 1989, pp. 23-25 
26 David Marples, "Ecological Issues Discussed at Founding Congress of'Zelenyi 
svit"', Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No.5, February 2, 1990, pp. 21-22. 
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dramatic increases in the incidence of environmentally related 
diseases heightened public awareness of the full consequences of 
unchecked industrialization and the development of unsafe energy 
facilities. The writings of environmentalists such as Valentin 
Rasputin and the Russian nationalist "village writers" also stimulat-
ed popular concerns about this matter. 29 
Official willingness to treat public concerns as a factor in 
the decision-making process was another component of populist 
environmentalism. A dispute in Kazakhstan in May 1988, was 
illustrative of this as, accordingto the TASS report, public opinion 
was the decisive factor in the decision by the local executive 
committee to move a plant site out of the city of Pavlodar to a 
location sixty kilometers away. Public concern over the environ-
mental impact of the operation of this particular facility within a 
population center prompted authorities to reverse an earlier 
decision on the basis of popular sentiment, an unlikely occurrence 
prior to the appearance of Gorbachev's new policy orientation. A 
few days later, TASS announced that the selection of Peteris 
Ziedinsh as chairman of Latvia's environmental protection 
committee had been determined by the input of popular rep res en-
tatives, scientists, and journalists. According to TASS, this appoint-
ment was the first time in the history of Soviet Latvia that a leader 
of ministerial rank had been chosen by public rather than by Party 
and governmental bodies. 30 One must also note that the appoint-
ment was equally significant because it demonstrated a tendency by 
regional leaders to take public attitudes into account in the 
formation of public policy. Even the crucial question of nuclear 
power was touched by this new tendency and, in response to 
popular sentiment, in 1991 the Ukrainian government announced 
that all Ukrainian nuclear facilities would be closed within four 
years. This announcement was a continuation of a trend seen with 
the earlier decision to ban the use of toxins for processing cotton 
and the cancellation of plans to divert the northern and Siberian 
rivers. 31 
29 
'The USSR This Week", Radio Liberty Research, RL 186/88, April 29, 1988, 
p.2 
30 'The USSR This Week", Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RLl95/88, May 11, 
1988, p. 7 RL203/88, p. 15, and FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, No. 25, February 6, 1991, 
p.96. 
31 Pravda, May 9, 1988, p. 2. 
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The targets of populist environmentalism were not limited 
to civilian nuclear facilities or even the all-important Soviet cotton 
industry. The once-sacred military establishment, long protected 
from scrutiny under the guise of national security, was also subject 
to popular protests because of its environmental record. In 1989, 
the "Initsiativa" environmental group took its vociferous campaign 
against the chemical weapons destruction facility, planned for the 
heavily populated Chapaevsk region, all the way to Moscow. This 
project was a key element in a US-Soviet agreement to reduce 
chemical weapons stockpiles. Eventually, a national commission 
examined the issue and, citing public unrest generated by the plan, 
recommended that another site be found. In 1990, popular 
protests against construction of a ballistic missile early warning 
station in the western Ukraine prompted the local oblast soviet to 
join in opposition to this project, in spite of the fact that much of 
the work had been completed. When the military resisted this 
order, the oblast stationed police officers on the construction site 
to prevent further work until Moscow finally order termination of 
the project. 32 In a similar fashion, for years Kazakhs were 
concerned about the contamination of their pastures by space 
debris generated as the spent stages of booster rockets, which were 
blown up over remote Kazakhstan in order to maintain military 
secrecy. As populist environmentalism gained acceptance, Kazakh 
citizens began to demand that the military actually pay for the 
damages to pasture lands, which were estimated as being in excess 
of 1.7 million rubles. 33 An additional illustration of problems with 
the Soviet military was provided in 1991 by the experiences of 
Russia's Arctic population with units of the Soviet Army. When a 
military unit established its fuel storage facility just 30 meters away 
from the sole source of drinking water for the village of Amderma, 
a leak resulted in damage estimated at 3 million rubles. Local 
residents, with the support of the Arkhangelsk Environmental 
Protection Committee, demanded that servicemen collect all of the 
ice and snow which had been soaked in fuel and remove it to a 
safe place. 34 
32 D. J. Peterson, "Impact of the Environmental Movement on the Soviet 
Military", Report on the USSR, l\Jarch 15,1991, pp. 5-7. 
33 V. Ryzhkov, "Payment for 'Rain"', Pravda, january 30, 1991, p. 8. 
:l4 Moscow Domestic Service, February 17, 1991, cited in jPRS Report: 
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Widespread concern over the excessive secrecy of Soviet 
military facilities coupled, with the military's poor safety record, 
resulted in official action in 1991. In January of that year the 
USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry placed twenty-seven top 
secret enterprises, which were producing explosives, under civilian 
control. The final motivating factor in this decision was an incident 
in Gorlovka in which miners accidently came into contact with a 
defense plant's chemical waste tank. Apparently, neither the plant 
nor the miners knew about each other's activities and, as a result, 
there was yet another tragedy in a long series of military related 
environmental accidents that had claimed dozens of lives in the 
USSR. 35 
Populist environmentalism, in spite of its broad support 
and the official endorsements that it received, generated consider-
able opposition. In considering the declining state of the Soviet 
Union's chemical industry, critics of the "Greens" denounced the 
"senselessness" of many of the demands of environmental groups, 
arguing that while nature needed to be protected, one "must not 
forget common sense." Accordingly, critics blamed the "Greens"not 
only for the USSR's shortage of soap, but also for the shortcomings 
of the pharmaceutical industry, the protein-vitamin concentrate 
industry, and the motion picture and photographic film industries. 
It was not the Soviet government, according to the critics of the 
"Greens" but rather the "Greens" who were responsible for the 
declining state of the Soviet economy in the final years of the 
USSR. 36 Moreover, according to some accounts, in spite of the 
"Greens" accusations, the chemical industry was doing everything 
possible to improve its operations and protect its workers. In 1991, 
Trud reported that while the "Greens were attacking the 'killer 
plants' that pollute the environment and destroy peoples' health, ... 
the 'killers' themselves are the biggest victims of all." 37 At the 
same time, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers cited a 70% increase in 
hard currency expenditures for chemical imports as evidence of 
the detrimental impact of popular protests against the chemical 
35 V. Reshetnikov, "Are Catastrophes Really Necessary",Izvestia,January28, 1991, 
p. 6 
3635. V. Antonov, "Are the Greens Always Right?", Izvestia, September 18, 1990, p. 
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industry. 38 A similar theme was sounded by Izvestia in a letter 
from the General Director of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station 
Production Association, who complained that environmental 
protesters were "ruled by emotion" and were responsible for losses 
which would "run into millions." 39 
The populist approach, however, has persisted well into the 
post-Soviet era. One elequent though perhaps isolated and 
romantic expression of this tendency surfaced in 1993 as the 
Russian oil industry continued its expansion into the Siberian 
wilderness. As "modern civilization," with its promises of money, 
electricity, telephones, and other material benefits, has closed in on 
the indigenous peoples of northern Russia, many of them have 
rejected demands that they give up their nomadic lifestyles and the 
traditional pastures which have supported them. The sight of 
telegraph poles, paved roads, and prefabricated huts has inspired 
some of these people to embrace a "back to the forest" movement 
which glorifies the traditional values of the region and encourages 
the pursuit of a life founded on native Siberian customs. Realists, 
however, point out that these people are a minority and that most 
Siberians seek the comforts that will come as a by-product of the 
expansion of the oil industry. 40 
Journalistic Environmentalism: Glasnost in Action 
Another feature of the new policy, something which was a 
direct consequence of glasnost, was increased attention to the 
bureaucratic confusion so frequently ridiculed by Westernjournal-
ists but, throughout most of the Soviet experience, rarely cited by 
Soviet commentators. As an example, one result of the Chernobyl 
disaster was the focus of a Radio Moscow commentary in Decem-
ber 1990 when reports surfaced that a train consisting of 29 
refrigerated cars filled with meat had been traveling around the 
USSR for four years. The meat, produced shortly after the 1986 
nuclear incident by the Gomel and Kalinkovichi meat combines 
near Chernobyl, had originally been dispatched to Soviet Georgia, 
where the consignees refused it because of its excessive level of 
38 "USSR Cabinet of Ministers Session", Pravda, February 6, 1991, p. 2. 
39 Izvestia, August 11,1990, p. 2. 
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radioactivity. From there it made other stops, only to be rejected 
at every station and, finally, sent back to where it started. As 
various bureaucracies in Moscow, the Ukraine and Belorussia 
debated the question of responsibility for disposal of this 20,000 
ton meat shipment, the seals were broken on several of the rail 
cars and meat which was not only radioactive but had been frozen 
and re-frozen was being sold in villages near the railroad facilities. 
In commenting on this situation, a Radio Moscow correspondent 
observed that "our country is probably the only one in the world 
where such dire management is possible." 41 
A consideration of the environmental impact of important 
industries became a hallmark of the Soviet policy process with the 
advent of glasnost and perestroika. This tendency was clearly 
demonstrated as early as 1988 when Pravda published a long 
article dealing with the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine on 
the shores of Lake Onega in Karelia. This seventy year old facility 
was one of the largest enterprises in the USSR and produced 40% 
of the nation's newsprint. Yet, according to Pravda, it played a 
destructive role with respect to the environment and its activities 
poisoned Lake Onega's Kondopoga Bay, once one of the region's 
richest areas for fishing and an important source of fresh drinking 
water. The Combine's efforts to reduce damage to the lake were 
encouraged by worker suggestions and involved an ambitious plan 
to use activated sludge as an additive for livestock feed. In spite of 
such endeavors, the Kondopoga Combine continued to pollute 
Lake Onega. 42 
Official explanations of the persistent environmental 
problems posed by the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine 
illustrated another theme being utilized in connection with the 
USSR's ecological concerns: that the bureaucratic style of many 
Soviet ministries resulted in poor economic and managerial 
performance. In order to minimize ecological damage caused by 
the plant's run-off, a drying shop costing millions of rubles was 
built in the purification complex in order to prepare sludge for use 
as an additive for livestock feed. Yet, the USSR Ministry of the 
Lumber Industry violated the procedures that were required for 
41 Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Reports-Soviet Union, No. 242, 
(Supplement) December 17, 1990, pp. 8-9 
42 Pravda,june 16, 1988, p. 2 
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effective operation of the purification works and, as a result, the 
expensive shop was never operable. The result was not only the 
waste of valuable resources but the discharge into Lake Onega of 
ten times as much toxic waste as the plan allowed. In its account 
of this incident, Pravda denounced the bureaucratic style of the 
Ministry of the Lumber Industry and repudiated the optimistic 
assertions of the Deputy Minister at that time, Yuri Guskov, that 
the lake's environmental situation was coming under control. 43 
In 1991, environmental conditions began to receive even 
more attention with the publication of a national ecological 
newspaper. Entitled SjJaseniye or "Salvation", this weekly newspaper 
was started as a result of a decision by the Soviet legislature and 
was intended, in part, to bring together the efforts of the forty 
local ecological publications operating at that time. Spaseniye was 
published by the State Committee for Environmental Protection 
and had an initial run of 30,000 copies, a rather small figure for a 
national publication. 44 
The Party's main newspaper also made several contribu-
tions to the public discussions about implementation of the new 
environmental policy. Throughout more than seven decades as a 
ruling party, during which this party of revolution was transformed 
into an instrument of order, the CPSU developed a style of 
leadership based on giving commands. In its treatment of the 
environmental issue, one could see at least rhetorical indications of 
a new tendency as the party, generally speaking through Pravda, 
began to speak of a leadership style that stressed appeals based on 
what might be seen as good conscience or a basic understanding 
of what constituted correct behavior. In considering the poor 
administrative record of the Ministry of the Lumber Industry, a 
Pravda article issued an appeal to the Ministry to be more consci-
entious, reminding its leadership of the "old saying that you get 
what you pay for."45 However, as we view this tendency with the 
benefit of our knowledge of the CPSU's eventual fall from power, 
it is important to question whether the party's new tendency 
extended beyond the level of rhetoric. Such rhetorical approaches 
43 Ibid. 
44 Moscow Domestic Service, March 2, 1991, cited injPRS Report: Enviromnental 
Issues, jPRS-TEN-91-006, March 21, 1991, p. 37 
45 Ibid. 
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had a greater utility as part of Gorbachev's long campaign against 
domestic rivals entrenched within most Soviet bureaucracies than 
as steps toward implementation of a new policy. It is also impor-
tant to note that environmental glasnost generated opposition both 
during and after the Soviet period. Before 1991, critics of glasnost 
complained about distortions of the USSR's essentially "solid" 
record on environmental matters, and after the collapse there have 
been individuals such as the Tomsk oblast administrator who 
argued that media reports had caused needless panic following the 
Tomsk-7 nuclear explosion in April 1993. According to the 
administrator, there were cases of iodine poisoning, especially 
among children who took unnecessary doses of iodine to prevent 
radiation sickness. 46 
Soviet Environmentalism and the Policy Process 
As a general rule, Soviet domestic and foreign policies were 
directly related to each other and were mutually supportive. Given 
the centralized nature of the Soviet decision-making machinery, 
this compatibility is not surprising. In spite of the gradual emer-
gence of a more vocal public, there was still one constituency - the 
Party elite - that had a dominant impact on both foreign and 
domestic policy. Accordingly, innovations in Soviet environmental 
policy supported Soviet foreign policy objectives in both Eastern 
Europe and among the Western nations. 
For years, Soviet authorities employed what they presented 
as their "progressive" ecological policy as a means of appealing to 
visitors from the West. Tourists visiting the Limnological Institute 
at Lake Baikal, for example, routinely heard presentations about 
fresh water as a tool for peace and the USSR's progressive 
ecological practices as a model for the industrialized states. 
However, in Gorbachev's final years there was a more ambitious 
effort to utilize environmental themes as a way of rallying non-
Communist support for Soviet foreign policies. The lack of success 
of the World Peace Cou ncil in 1986 led to speculation that, as a 
propaganda theme, peace had lost its utility and should be 
replaced by an emphasis on protection of the environment. 
Evidently, Soviet propaganda specialists believed that an environ-
mental theme would enable them to reach a larger audience and 
46 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 69, April 13, 1993 
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establish useful contacts with large, well-organized non-Communist 
groups in Western Europe and North America. The strength of 
environmental movements in the West, at the time, contrasted 
sharply with the increasing inability of the peace movement to 
create a sustained, effective political drive against US military 
programs. By linking itself to this powerful political force, Soviet 
public diplomacy would become much more effective in generating 
a favorable image of the USSR while simultaneously stressing its 
view of capitalism as a negative environmental factor. 47 In 
pursuit of this theme, the Soviet Union endeavored to assume the 
role of a world leader on environmental issues. In 1988, the 
Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet proposed 
that Moscow be the site of an international conference on the 
problems of ecological protection and that the conference give 
consideration to a Soviet plan to end nuclear confrontation in 
Northern Europe and the Arctic as a way to reduce "the threat to 
living nature", thus bringing together the issues of peace and 
ecology in a setting favorable to the Soviet position.48 Until the 
final months of the existence of the USSR, Gorbachev, who 
consistently spoke of the "interests of all humanity" rather than 
simply of the interests of the working class, stressed the Soviet 
desire to host such a gathering. 
Well before the collapse of the Communist governments in 
1989 and 1990, there was a small though vocal environmental 
movement in Eastern Europe. This movement, part of the region'S 
emerging civil society, often had an impact in certain limited 
parallel sectors, such as literature in the final years of the German 
Democratic Republic, but in the Communist period it was, with a 
few exceptions, not usually a significant and direct factor in the 
political sphere. (As a notable exception, the Polish Ecology Club 
successfully petitioned the Polish government to close several 
industrial plants that were major environmental hazards.) In the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl incident, there were indications of a 
growing concern with nuclear power, especially Soviet nuclear 
power, among citizens of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. 
Anxiety over nuclear power, however, merely added another to a 
long list of popular as well as official grievances against the Soviet 
47 
48 
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Union in this period. The list of grievances of East Europeans 
included numerous instances of air and water pollution emanating 
from Soviet territory into Eastern Europe. 49 By expressing 
greater and more genuine official alarm over its environmental 
problems, the Soviet leadership enhanced, at least to a degree, its 
tarnished image in Eastern Europe. As that region ventured into 
the post-Communist era, such an effort became more important, 
as the Soviets could no longer rely exclusively upon a network of 
ruling Communist parties striving to win the official favor of the 
Kremlin. 
There were, however, limits to the political gains that the 
weakening Soviet leadership could derive from a reduction of the 
USSR's emphasis on nuclear power. A reduced Soviet nuclear 
power base would mean greater pressure on non-nuclear domestic 
energy sources. Such a development seriously hampered Soviet 
efforts to provide energy assistance to several of its East European 
neighbors. The case of Romania was especially telling in this 
regard because, before the 1989 revolu tion, a deteriorating 
domestic fuel situation in Romania resulted in agreements for 
increased amounts of Soviet electricity, coal, and gas to be provid-
ed to a struggling Communist regime. A rise in Soviet domestic 
requirements for those fuels had a direct negative impact on the 
quantity of Soviet assistance to Bucharest and further weakened a 
Romanian economy already on the verge of collapse before the 
revolution. 
An additional reason for the limited benefits of the new 
Soviet policy was found in the increasingly contradictory nature of 
perestroika and glasnost. While the latter helped stimulate a 
growing environmental movement, it could not sustain that 
movement through a period of economic change. A fundamental 
concern of perestroika was the redirection and re-organization of 
a faltering Soviet economy. In practice, this effort involved a 
privatization program which encouraged a new conception of the 
value of land. A victim of the legislative activity of this period was 
the USSR's important program of park management, an effort that 
.9 John M. Kramer, 'The Environmental Crisis in Eastern Europe", Slavic Review, 
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supported a consistent, long-term preservation of valuable Soviet 
park lands such as those around Lake Baikal. As rights to land 
were transferred to the soviets, the most basic unit of local 
government, there was a tendency to redraw the boundaries of 
parks to transfer park land to various commercial associations and 
enterprises. With land having a more direct monetary value, profit 
became a new element in the equation of the preservation of 
numerous natural resources. Consequently, with increasing 
frequency land-owners and land-users opposed the establishment 
of new parks, nature preserves, and wildlife sanctuaries and, in 
fact, struggled to cut the size of existing facilities. The acquisition 
of greater power by local units of government, a fundamental part 
of perestroika, encouraged Soviet republics to make claims against 
the USSR's political center. One vivid example of this tendency was 
the Turkmenian Republic'S attempts to convert nature reserves, 
including the unique Krasnovodsk (Gasan-kuli) reserve, into 
pasturage which could be exploited economically. Working outside 
the legal system, the Soviet mafia was implicated in the physical 
assault on leaders of the "Greens" as part of its effort to discourage 
criticisms of new economic practices in which the Soviet under-
world had a stake. Thus, the message of Soviet reforms, initially 
supportive of ecological interests, in the end became detrimental 
to those needs. 50 
Recognition of these limits was underscored by the 
consistent efforts of the USSR's "forces of order" to reassert central 
control in order to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet Union as 
a state. Both the substance as well as the process of the Soviet 
decision-making apparatus were affected by the resurgence of 
orthodox political forces alarmed by the diminution of central 
authority. The close linkage between many nationalist movements 
and a local environmental movement was a serious threat to the 
substance of Soviet environmental policy. This linkage was 
illustrated by efforts of the Georgian Supreme Soviet in 1991 to 
deal with the problem of contaminated food being shipped into the 
republic. Nationalistic forces in the Georgian government de-
nounced the transfer of these foodstuffs, generally originating from 
the Chernobyl area, as deliberate acts of radiation and chemical 
50 K. Smirnov, "Do Not Let Baikal Go for a Pittance", Iz.veslia, November 4,1990, 
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sabotage, and incorporated a Georgian Supreme Soviet commission 
report on this issue into its secessionist rhetoric. 51 As the inde-
pendence movements came under increasing pressure, much of it 
violent as in the Baltics in January, 1991, it became more difficult 
to voice demands for recognition of the environmental devastation 
wrought by Moscow's industrial practices. Criticism of central 
environmental neglect was, by 1991, interpreted as a challenge to 
central political authority and, as a result, was threatened with 
official sanctions. Under these circumstances, prevalent in 1991, 
maintenance of the changes in the Soviet policy process was 
becoming especially difficult. 
Conclusions and the Past, the Present and the Future 
Several conclusions are suggested by this examination of 
the Kremlin's "new thinking" on environmental issues during the 
final years of Soviet power. The first relates to the policy process 
itself and demonstrates the extent of changes in the Gorbachev 
years. The most important assumption about the policy process was 
that public participation was more and more a fact of life in the 
area of environmental policy as well as in others, and helped 
develop the sort of civic consciousness that eventually helped break 
the CPSU's monopoly on political power. Demonstrations and 
petitions became an accepted feature of the decision-making 
process, while public opinion, with increasing frequency, was at 
least cited as a factor in decisions. Second, there was a marked 
reduction in the secrecy that had surrounded environmental data 
since the mid-1970s. Critical reports were rou tin ely pu blished and, 
with the new atmosphere engendered by glasnost, became the 
subject of intense public scrutiny and debate. Finally, the policy 
process was changed by efforts to adopt a new style in decision-
making. Concerns about environmental protection were often 
linked with denunciations of a "bureaucratic style" of administration 
that was associated with ecologically destructive policies. This same 
style, one should note, was also associated with many of those 
elements of the Soviet system which opposed Gorbachev and his 
policies. Even Pravda joined in appealing for a more effective 
managerial style, raising hopes that the Party itself might adopt a 
51 Foreign Broadcast Injormation Service: Daily Reports - Soviet Union, No. 26, 
February 7, 1991, p. 85 
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different leadership role, one characterized by a more "inspiration-
al" and less "dictatorial" attitude. 
Yet, as the policy process changed, the decision-making 
environment was also altered. In this respect, one of the most 
important developments was the proliferation of contradictory 
demands on the system. Environmental demands, in particular, 
were often inconsistent; calls for a reduced dependency on nuclear 
energy had to be balanced by demands for correction of ecological 
problems produced by excessive utilization of soft coal and other 
fuels associated with severe pollution. It was extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to formulate a single and consistent state ecological 
policy for such a diverse nation as the USSR. The decision-making 
environment was further complicated by the fact that ecological 
concerns were often linked with political demands and ethnic 
grievances, both of which were more sensitive than environmental 
issues. It is also important to note that, for nationalist leaders, 
interest in environmental issues faded to a secondary status once 
they ceased to provide a "political fig leaf' for nationalist indepen-
dence struggles, which, by the latter years of the USSR, were 
conducted quite openly. Not surprisingly, within the context of a 
national crackdown against nationalist or ethnic demands, there 
was a reduction of the prospects for a continuation of the ecologi-
cal glasnost that had become a part of journalistic environmen-
talism. Had the 1991 coup attempt been successful and the USSR 
itself endured the disruption of that event, it is likely that environ-
mental disclosures would have become much more constrained. 
In addition to the prospect of a reassertion of authority by 
the USSR's "forces of order", Soviet foreign policy was another 
important variable that affected progress on environmental issues. 
The reduction of Soviet military requirements had a positive 
impact on ecological decision-making in that it lessened the 
importance of the strategic and security interests which so often 
were motivating forces in dealing with ecological issues. The 
practice of detonating spent booster rockets of Kazakh pastures was 
one illustration of the destruction of nature associated with 
prevailing military priorities. The establishment of new regime 
priorities allowed greater consideration of environmental values 
and, as a consequence, enhanced the USSR's standing in those 
European nations - both East and West - that were alarmed by 
Soviet environmental neglect. There was, however, a collateral cost 
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associated with such a transformation in Soviet policies, especially 
as they related to the production of energy sources. A significant 
reduction in the USSR's nuclear energy capabilities reduced 
Moscow's ability to cement its relations with various European 
states by providing energy assistance. Romania, for example, was 
clearly affected by this reorientation of energy priorities. There 
was, of course, the corresponding advantage associated with this 
policy shift: the prospect of propelling the USSR into a position of 
leadership in the politically powerful global environmental 
movement. 
In view of uncertainty surrounding the Soviet domestic 
situation in the final years of the USSR and the unwillingness of 
the KGB, the military, and the more orthodox Communists to 
accept the dramatic revisions in the Soviet policy process, it is not 
surprising that many questioned the extent to which the system 
itself had really changed. Without a doubt, it is reasonable to 
suggest that Gorbachev, as CPSU leader until the death of the 
Party, was determined to make a significant departure from past 
practices. His approach went well beyond the modest, managerial 
environmentalism of the mid-1980s, including those cau tious steps 
of the first Gorbachev years. This earlier tendency to relieve 
ecological pressures without altering social or economic structures 
was replaced by the efforts of Gorbachev and other more radical 
reformist elements to bring about changes that would profoundly 
alter public and official consciousness about the state of the Soviet 
environment. These efforts became a part of the agenda of the 
USSR's growing democratic movements and, as such, their fate 
rose with the fortunes of reformers who wanted to change not only 
environmental policy but, more importantly, the very nature of the 
Soviet political and social system. 
In the end, however, it was obvious that these endeavors 
often did little toward abatement of the USSR's environmental 
problems. Consequently, the USSR's successor states now face 
severe environmental problems at a time when they have few of 
the resources needed to face those demands. Consider the 
dimensions of the following problems: Most water resources of the 
"Soviet region" are polluted, usually as a result of inadequate 
sewage treatment facilities. In addition, most of the 220 million 
hectares of arable land currently in use suffers from a mechanical 
composition that makes it unsuitable for many crops, while over 
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80% of the area's grasslands can no longer be used. Meanwhile, 
public health is showing the effects of this ecological disaster. 
Throughout the 1980s, there was a 12% increase in the number of 
terminal cancer cases and, in states such as Kazakhstan and 
Moldova, both of which have extremely poor drinking water, life 
expectancies have fallen below the already very low Soviet stan-
dard. 52 
One should also note the systemic conditions prevailing in 
the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet center. While the 
Russian Federation adopted an environmental program in 1992, 
most of the other successor states have made few statements and 
adopted no policies relating to the treatment of these and other 
disastrous environmental conditions. "'That exists is an ad hoc 
arrangement in which individual nations might or might not 
conclude agreements with other states to deal with some aspect of 
the larger regional ecosystem. Estonia, for example, recently 
concluded an agreement with Finland for the exchange of 
environmentalinformation, and regional protocols on water quality 
have been established between some of the Central Asian states. 53 
In 1992, most of the CIS members signed an agreement on 
cooperation in the area of environmental protection, but little has 
been done to assign a high priority to any of the issues related to 
environmental protection. 
In this new era, environmental concerns hold a relatively 
low priority because of the region'S difficult economic circumstanc-
es. First, the area still suffers from the erosion of industrial 
discipline that was a product of Gorbachev's perestroika. At the 
same time, the disruption of economic relationships that came with 
the collapse of the USSR has further aggravated an already 
troubled economy. Consequently, the enforcement of the few 
industrial environmental standards which exist within these nations 
cannot be very rigid. Second, given the failure of perestroika to 
institute significant industrial changes, most of the new states are 
still dependent on the extraction of enormous quantities of raw 
materials for their own inefficient industries and the export of 
52 Georgi S. Golitsyn, "Ecological Problems in the CIS During the Transitional 
Period', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 2,january, 1993, pp. 33-41 
53 Alo Kullamaa, "Environment Knows No State Borders", Paevaleht,january 12, 
1993, p. 1 
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natural resources as a way of acquiring the hard currency neces-
sary for survival in the post-Soviet era. 
Therefore, we must conclude that this most enduring 
legacy of the Russian empire's socialist experiment will persist and 
perhaps assume even larger dimensions well into the post-Commu-
nist era. The reforms of the Gorbachev years did little to abate 
most of the nation's ecological crises and, in fact, made the 
situation worse in some respects. The current economic crisis, 
another legacy of socialism, has exacerbated deteriorating environ-
mental conditions and appears likely to inhibit well into the next 
century any ambitious measures to alleviate the various forms of 
environmental degradation which plague the former Soviet 
republics. 
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An anti-entrepreneurial climate exists in Hungary, a clim-
ate fostered by decades of Communist propaganda and by the 
activities of the ripoff-artists and con-men who have appeared in 
inordinate numbers since the fall of the regime. Yet enterprise is 
a thing whose time has come. Hungary's new entrepreneurs have 
to fight an uphill battle against bureaucratic red-tape and en-
trenched state monopolies, but seem to be winning against both. 
While the private enterprises they own are usually small, the 
country already has its first millionaires. A collective portrait of 
them shows that they have unusual social sensitivity. Their wealth 
grows in leaps and bounds, even as increasing economic differenti-
ation has left over a third of the population living below the 
poverty line. Fearing social and political explosions, the new 
super-rich at first supported moderate, centrist forces within the 
existing political parties, but more recently they have moved to 
create a political platform of their own: a party of entrepreneurs. 
"A Nation of Shopkeepers" 
The development of a politically conscious entrepreneurial 
class with a party of its own was very rapid in Hungary. Shortly 
after the collapse of the Communist regime and the first free 
elections in August 1990, the Americanjournalist Celestine Bohlen 
wrote that Hungary was on the verge of becoming a "nation of 
shopkeepers." Her prediction turned out to be strikingly accurate. 
By the end of 1991 there were over 400,000 individual entrepre-
neurs and 10,000 private firms active in a country of just over ten 
million people. By July 1992 the total number of enterprises stood 
at 638,275, with a 19% growth rate reported during the previous 
three months alone. At first glance, Hungarians' reactions to the 
transformation from a command economy to a system based on 
private enterprise present a paradox. The majority hope that the 
free market will lead to an improvement in their lives. A public 
opinion survey conducted in October 1991 for the European 
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